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It is well-known from US-related studies that investors systematically overreact to 
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1  Introduction 
The recent accounting scandals relating to firms like Enron, Worldcom, or Parmalat 
have shown that accounting data is subject to manipulation. Though this insight may 
not be new, it nevertheless raises public attention towards serious frictions in the 
information gathering process of public capital markets. As long as these frictions are 
related to fraudulent misrepresentation in financial statements only, our paradigm of 
informational efficient capital markets might not be seriously challenged. In that case 
the society should focus on improving the enforcement of accounting rules, as it has 
been done in the aftermath of the Enron accounting scandal. 2 However, if it turns out 
that investors can be systematically deceived even by management’s discretionary - 
but lawful - application of accounting rules, the paradigm of informational efficient 
capital markets has to be put into question rather seriously. 
It has been pointed out in a seminal paper by Sloan (1996) that the capital market 
might be unable to lift the veil of accounting information. In fact, by splitting up US-
firms’ earnings in a cash flow and a non cash flow related part, where the latter is 
usually labelled as accruals, he finds that earnings can much better be explained by 
prior year’s cash flows than by prior year’s accruals. Simultaneously, he can show 
that investors’ earnings expectations, as reflected in securities prices, seem not to 
correctly account for this difference in the persistence of the two earnings 
components. Moreover, investors’ earnings expectations tend to be biased upwards 
with respect to accruals and at the same time biased downwards with respect to 
operating cash flows. As similar results have been presented by other studies over 
the last years, it has become widespread to label this phenomenon as the accrual 
anomaly. It is an anomaly because investors seem to behave as naïve decision 
makers, in as much they fixate on aggregate earnings without correctly taking into 
account the difference in the persistency of cash flows relative to accruals. Taking 
                                                 
2 From this perspective it seems that the US regulatory response to accounting fraud was successful, in 
as much the introduction of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 seems to have reduced earnings 
manipulations of US firms; cf. Cohen et al. (2005).   2 
into account that earnings management predominantly comes from accruals, this is 
the same as saying that the market can be deceived by financial statements’ window 
dressing. 
Evidently, the accrual anomaly is bad news for the widespread understanding of 
informational efficient capital markets. It is therefore important to gather a deeper 
knowledge of the driving factors behind these findings. Actually, some cross-country 
studies indicate that the accrual anomaly is less severe in code law countries. As a 
consequence the obvious question arises, whether and to what extent the anomaly is 
related to the regulatory environment. Evidently, given that there must be a link 
between the accrual anomaly and the earnings management activities of a company, 
specific corporate governance mechanisms as well as accounting rules can be thought 
of driving this alleged market inefficiency. To improve our understanding it might be 
important to isolate the relative impact of these two variables. Moreover, from an 
accounting perspective we will be especially interested in assessing the impact of 
different accounting standards. This, unfortunately, is not possible in a cross-country 
approach, as it is difficult to observe to what extent a difference in accrual mispricing 
is due to a different corporate governance regime and to what extent it might be due 
to different accounting rules. 
To our understanding, the German capital market provides highly interesting 
evidence in this regard, as over the last 10 years an intriguing capital market 
experiment is going on there. Actually, by the beginning of this period almost all 
German companies complied with German-GAAP (HGB), while over recent years 
almost all of them switched to international accounting standards, either IFRS/IAS or 
US-GAAP.3 Therefore, the German experiment is a natural choice for addressing the 
question to what extent the investors’ perception of accounting information differs 
among different accounting standards for a given corporate governance regime. 
                                                 
3 The reader should note that by the year 2005 all listed companies in the European Union have to 
comply with IFRS/IAS as far as their consolidated financial statements are concerned.   3 
Needless to say, the answer to this question has important implications with respect 
to accounting regulation. 
Our findings are quite interesting and make a contribution to the literature in at least 
two directions. First, we find clear evidence that the accrual anomaly discovered by 
Sloan (1996) is also present on the German capital market confirming hereby the 
ubiquitousness of this phenomenon. Second, and most importantly, we find clear 
evidence that the overreaction to accrual-based information is mostly related to firms 
complying with international accounting standards. This is quite astonishing as there 
is conventional wisdom that IFRS/IAS and US-GAAP provide more accurate 
financial information to the capital market than German-GAAP. For instance, Bartov 
et al. (2001) report that earnings disclosed under Anglo-Saxon accounting standards 
do better explain stock returns than cash flow figures alone, while this kind of 
superiority of earnings over cash flows does not exist for financial statements 
disclosed under German or Japan accounting rules. Results pointing in the same 
direction have been presented also by Harris et al. (1994) or Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000). It should be emphasized that our findings do not necessarily contradict these 
studies, as they analyze to what extent stock price movements can be explained by 
earnings figures. This paper, however, is focused on the question whether the stock 
price movement itself is efficient given the information content of earnings figures. 
Hence, it may well be that under a specific accounting standard the stock price 
movement is in the short run highly associated with disclosed earnings but 
nevertheless inefficient in the sense that there is an accounting driven bias in the 
assessment of the firm’s long run profitability. Moreover, these papers once again 
suffer from a lack of cross-sectional variance in the sense that they cannot separate 
between the influence coming from the corporate governance system and the 
influence coming form the accounting system. 
As in this paper the influence of different accounting systems is scrutinized holding 
the corporate governance system constant, it will be able to address the question 
whether disclosed information quality is superior under a true and fair view   4 
accounting approach, as represented by IFRS or US-GAAP, or under a conservative 
accounting approach, as represented by German GAAP. Although intuitively one 
might expect the former to be superior over the latter in terms of disclosure quality, 
our results point in the opposite direction. The simple explanation for this result is 
related to an idea recently put forward by Guay and Verrecchia (2006). Conservative 
accounting relies on easy-to-verify information, while true and fair view accounting 
aims to incorporate a substantial amount of difficult-to-verify information, like fair 
value information of non traded assets. Evidently, the second approach leaves much 
more discretion to management as the first one. Hence, the quality of information 
disclosed under a true and fair view approach is intertwined with the quality of 
corporate governance. From that perspective it might not be that surprising anymore, 
why true and fair view accounting is not superior in terms of information quality 
under a weak corporate governance system, as it is the German one. Evidently, this 
result challenges the recent trends in European accounting regulation. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. Section 3 
discusses the theoretical background underlying our study. Moreover, it develops 
the hypotheses and describes our research design. Section 4 presents the results, 
while section 5 will summarize the study. 
2  Related Literature 
Accruals are often used in empirical studies as a measure for earnings management. 
Deviations of reported current accruals from their fair values typically result in 
future corrections of earnings4. Therefore, a relatively high degree of earnings 
management should cause a relatively low earnings persistency. Since the seminal 
paper of Sloan (1996), showing that  investors’ earnings expectations reflected in 
securities prices do not correctly account for the different degree of persistency of 
accruals versus cash flows, several studies corroborate investors’ overreaction with 
                                                 
4 Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a model of the quality of accruals and earnings. They show that 
accrual estimation errors result in future earnings’ corrections.   5 
respect to the information contained in accruals. This phenomenon is called the 
accrual anomaly.5 The US-related study by Xie (2001) confirms the empirical results 
of Sloan (1996) and refines them by introducing a more accurate measure of earnings 
management based on the definition of abnormal accruals.6 This result is further 
corroborated in a study presented by Chen and Cheng (2002). They argue that 
abnormal accruals can be used by management either to signal private information 
about future performance or for opportunistic earnings management. By identifying 
a sub-sample of firms where the management is more likely to engage in earnings 
management they can show that future abnormal returns are negatively associated 
with abnormal accruals for these firms, whereas the association is positive for those 
firms that are presumed to use abnormal accruals as a mean for signalling future 
performance. Therefore, investors seem not to be able to detect the management’s 
motivation for using abnormal accruals. 
One strand of literature has concentrated on the question whether the extent of the 
accrual anomaly is related to the degree of sophisticated investors active on the 
capital market.7 Ali et al. (1999) find that the overvaluation of accruals increases with 
the number of institutional investors holding shares of a firm. In contrast, Collins et 
al. (2003) show that firms with a relatively high level of transient institutional 
ownership are less affected by the mispricing of accruals. Further empirical results 
related to the US stock market demonstrate that biased analysts’ earnings 
expectations contribute to the market’s overreaction with respect to accruals, e.g. 
Bradshaw et al. 2001, Elgers et al. 2003. After all, the effect of investor sophistication 
on the accrual anomaly for the US stock market is rather mixed. 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that the accrual anomaly is not the only phenomenon indicating that capital 
market might react inefficiently to accounting data. Most importantly, the literature on the post 
earnings announcement drift should be mentioned here; for related evidence cf. Ball and Brown (1968) 
and, for an overview, Ball (1992). A behavioural oriented explanation is presented by Houghe and 
Loughran (2000).  
6 This work is based on Jones (1991) who proposed an approach how to differentiate between normal 
and abnormal accruals. 
7 It should be noted in this regard that Bartov et al. (2000) find that the post earnings announcement 
drift in stock prices is primarily due to trading activities of unsophisticated investors.    6 
Most of the empirical studies on the accrual anomaly are based on US data. Only a 
very few studies analyse this phenomenon in a non-US or international context. 
Pincus et al. (2003) analyse the valuation of accruals for different common law (e.g. 
USA, UK) and code law (e.g. Germany, France) countries for the years from 1992 to 
2000. They find that the accrual anomaly regularly exists in common law countries, 
whereas there is no evidence of a mispricing of accruals in the code law countries. 8 
They explain their results with the difference in corporate governance structures 
between common law and code law countries. Firms in code law countries show a 
broader set of inside stakeholders, who better perceive the information contained in 
earnings’ components. A similar study has been presented by LaFond (2005). By 
examining 17 industrialised countries over the period 1989 to 2003 he found the 
accrual anomaly to be a global phenomenon in as much a significant mispricing can 
be detected in all the countries with the exception of Denmark and Norway. 
Moreover, he finds no evidence that the degree of mispricing is related to managerial 
discretion, ownership structure, analyst coverage or specific accounting methods. 
Finally, it should be noted that although the accrual anomaly is a global phenomenon 
according to the paper of LaFond (2005), he also documents that the degree of 
accrual overpricing is very different among countries. By looking on the abnormal 
return of a hedge portfolio long in the low accruals firms and short in the high 
accrual firms it can be deduced from his results that the average mispricing in Anglo-
Saxon countries is almost twice as high as in the Continental European countries and 
Japan. 
To sum up, there is increasing evidence that the accrual anomaly is, in fact, a global 
phenomenon although the degree of mispricing seems to be more pronounced in 
common law countries than in code law countries. This is rather striking, for at least 
two reasons. First, as it has already pointed out earnings reported under 
international or US accounting standards are usually regarded to provide more 
                                                 
8 This is corroborated also by Babalyan (2004) who shows that a least for those German and Swiss 
firms that comply with IFRS/IAS no overpricing of accruals can be detected.   7 
accurate information about the economic situation of a company (e.g. Bartov et al. 
(2001) and Harris et al. (1994). Second, Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings 
management is more pronounced in countries with less developed investor 
protection. Typically, this is the case in code law countries as opposed to common 
law countries. 9 According to the authors the theoretical explanation of this finding 
goes as follows: earnings management activities are driven by the incentive of 
insiders to protect their private benefits by concealing firm performance from 
outsiders. Because the collection of private benefits is easier the less developed 
investor protection is, earnings management incentives are more pronounced in code 
law countries. Hence, one would expect the accrual anomaly to be more pronounced 
in code law than in common law countries. 
Strictly speaking this reasoning is only true under invariant accounting standards. 
Hence, whatever the cross-country evidence on the accrual anomaly might be, it will 
be influenced by cross-sectional variation in corporate governance as well as in the 
accounting system. In order to sort out to what extent the anomaly is driven by 
accounting rules only, it is necessary to look at different accounting standards under 
one corporate governance system. This is the unique advantage of the data set under 
consideration here. It is very interesting in this regard that Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2004) can show that earnings management as measured by 
discretionary accruals seems to be more severe for German firms reporting under 
IFRS/IAS than under German-GAAP (HGB). Similarly, Zimmermann and 
Gontcharov (2003) report that German firms complying with IFRS/IAS engage more 
in income smoothing than those complying with German GAAP. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the accrual anomaly can be proved to contradict 
the assumption of efficient capital market only, if it can be shown that it leads to an 
economically exploitable mispricing. This has not yet been proven as it is not clear 
whether the overvaluation of high accrual firms leads to an arbitrage opportunity, if 
                                                 
9 Cf. in this regard the comprehensive study of La Porta et al. (2000).   8 
transaction costs and arbitrage risk is taken into account. Several studies (e.g. Collins 
et al. 2003, Richardson 2003, Mashruwala 2004) examine the attributes of extreme 
accrual firms for the US stock market. They conclude that high accrual firms are 
more likely to be exposed to high transaction costs. Furthermore, short selling and 
hedging strategies seem to be rather risky even for institutional investors because of 
substantial fundamental and arbitrage risk. 
3  Theory, Hypotheses and Research Design 
3.1  Accounting Standards, Earnings Quality and Accrual Mispricing 
German GAAP undoubtedly is a conservative accounting system. According to Guay 
and Verrecchia (2006) such a system is characterized by timely recognition of losses 
and less timely recognition of gains. The prudence principle known under German 
GAAP relates exactly to this asymmetric treatment of gains and losses. Among 
others, this is implemented by the imparity principle, which requires unrealized 
losses to be expensed in the profit and loss statement, while it is not allowed to 
account for unrealized earnings. This approach, together with a strong emphasis on 
historical cost accounting, allowed German companies to build up hidden reserves. It 
has often been argued that in this way German companies have been able to 
manipulate reported earnings. 10 
While we do not disagree with this view, we are interested in the question whether 
such discretionary opportunities are reduced under Anglo-Saxon driven accounting 
standards, like US-GAAP or IFRS/IAS. It should be noticed that these standards are 
build up under the true and fair view principle, which is, basically, a requirement 
that present and potential investors should be provided with useful information in 
order to make a rational investment decision. Under this view financial reporting is 
oriented towards the information requirements of the capital market investors. 
                                                 
10 Cf. Harris et al. (1994) for some more details on the German accounting system. A spectacular case 
where the shortcomings of German GAAP have become evident internationally was the near failure of 
Metallgesellschaft, a large German company a that time; cf. among others Miller and Culp (1995). 
Wenger/Kaserer (1998) emphasize the problems arising from a conservative accounting system in a 
weak corporate governance system.   9 
Now, we argue that giving a true picture of the current economic situation of a 
company is not an easy task and, what is even more important, cannot be done 
without leaving valuation judgements in the discretion of the management. This can 
be seen, for instance, in the context of the fair value accounting principle, which is a 
pillar of the true and fair view approach, as opposed to the historical cost principle 
governing German GAAP. Calculating a fair value is easy, as long as there is a 
market price. However, for many assets and liabilities fair value accounting is 
allowed although market values do not exist. It is evident that management 
discretion becomes an issue in these cases. More generally, one can say that the true 
and fair view principle makes economic judgement by people that are responsible for 
financial reporting much more important. Speaking with Guay and Verrecchia (2006) 
one can say that conservative accounting systems, like German GAAP, rely on easy-
to-verify information, while true and fair view accounting systems, like US-GAAP or 
IFRS/IAS, rely on difficult-to-verify information. As a consequence, the latter are 
much more exposed to management’s discretion as the former one. 11 
In order to make this assertion more precise, two short examples should be given 
here. First, consider the treatment of intangible assets under both accounting 
approaches. IAS 38.72 states that intangible assets meeting certain criterias could be 
valued according to the historical cost approach, as it is the case under German 
GAAP, or according to the revaluation approach. If the latter is used, the book value 
of the asset is equal to its fair value taking any subsequent amortization or 
impairment losses into account. Although the fair value shall be determined by 
reference to an active market, it is evident that the revaluation approach grants large 
discretionary power to the management. Moreover, German GAAP is by far more 
restrictive with respect to the recognition of an item as an intangible asset. Most 
importantly, the recognition of internally generated intangible assets is not allowed, 
                                                 
11 As a corollary it should be noted that an additional reason why German GAAP tend to reduce the 
importance of subjective judgements is the close relationship between financial and tax accounting in 
Germany.   10 
while according to IAS 38.51 this is possible. In practice, the recognition of 
development costs is the most important issue in this context. Again it is evident that 
when determining the cost of an internally generated intangible asset ample 
discretion is provided for the management. 
A second example in this context is the impairment rule according to IAS 36. Under 
this rule the company has to assess at each reporting date whether an asset may be 
impaired and, if so, it has to estimate the recoverable amount of the asset.12 
According to IAS 36.18 the recoverable amount is, basically, determined by the fair 
value of the asset. It is evident that for such assets that are not traded on liquid 
markets this rule grants again huge discretionary power to the management. 
Recently, this rule has become notorious because of large goodwill impairment 
losses. Under German GAAP goodwill has been subject to regular depreciation, 
while impairment was only exceptionally allowed.13  
Now, it is not our point to say that there is less discretionary leeway under German 
GAAP than under international accounting standards. However, the above 
mentioned examples should have made clear that by taking a closer look at the 
different accounting rules it is by far not clear which of the different standards gives 
more window dressing opportunities to the management. Now, if this is the case, 
why does empirical research indicate that earnings in common law countries, where 
fair value accounting dominates, do have more explanatory power for stock prices 
than under code law countries, where up to the nineties fair value accounting was 
almost absent? Actually, the reason might be that earnings quality is not only 
influenced by accounting standards, but also by the corporate governance regime. 
Hence, by looking at earnings quality from a cross-country perspective one cannot 
                                                 
12 What makes the application of this rule even fuzzier is the fact that impairment is not only done 
with respect to a single asset but could also be applied to so called cash generating units; cf. IAS 36.6. 
Cash generating units are unknown under German GAAP. 
13 Additional examples providing evidence for ampler discretion under IFRS than under German 
GAAP could be mentioned. For instance, the fair value approach with respect to property, plant, and 
equipment (IAS 16) or the fair value option for financial instruments (IAS 39) could be indicated here. 
For a detailed comparison of local accounting standards and IFRS cf. Nobes (2001).   11 
easily differentiate, whether the results are driven by different accounting standards 
or by a different corporate governance regime. 14 Most probably, both factors will 
drive the results simultaneously. 
Hence, in order to figure out whether one accounting standard improves earnings 
quality with respect to another, it is of crucial importance to control for the effects 
coming from the corporate governance environment. This is most easily done, if one 
looks at companies using different accounting standards under one corporate 
governance framework. This approach is used in this article.   
3.2  Hypotheses 
The analysis proceeds as follows: first, we show that also for German firms accruals 
and cash flows have a different predictive power with respect to future earnings, i.e. 
their persistency is different. Second, we investigate whether investors take account 
of this difference in persistency when pricing stocks. If this is not the case, the accrual 
anomaly arises. In a third step, we look at whether the persistency of accrual and 
cash flows is different under different accounting standards, and, if so, whether this 
is reflected in stock prices. 
More precisely, the following null-hypotheses will be tested.   
H0(i):  Persistence hypothesis: Earnings persistency with respect to prior year’s 
accruals is not significantly different from earnings persistency with respect 
to prior year’s cash flows. 
The second hypothesis tests for capital market efficiency with respect to publicly 
available information contained in different earnings components: 
                                                 
14 In fact, Leuz et al. (2003) argues that their result, namely that earnings management is less 
pronounced in common law countries than in code law countries, may be mostly driven by difference 
in investor protection. As they regard differences in accounting rules as just one element among many 
others, no explicit analysis of the impact of different accounting rules is possible within their analysis. 
This point is also emphasized by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) who argue that the development of 
conservative accounting systems was basically driven by the legal and political system in civil law 
countries.   12 
H0(iia):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis I: The weighting of prior year’s accruals and cash 
flows in investors’ earnings expectations reflects without significant bias the 
persistency measured according to the earnings forecasting relation. 
Because the correct perception of earnings persistency by investors should be 
equivalent to abnormal returns being unrelated to prior year’s earnings components, 
we also test the following alternative hypothesis: 
H0(iib):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis II: Abnormal returns do not significantly depend 
on prior year’s earnings components, i.e. accruals and cash flows. 
Since 1998, German firms are allowed to prepare consolidated financial statements 
under internationally accepted accounting standards.15 As has been explained in the 
previous section, it is by far not clear whether IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP, resp., provide 
less earnings management opportunities.  Therefore, we formulate our third 
hypothesis: 
H0(iii):  Persistence hypothesis under different accounting standards: Earnings reported 
under German-GAAP (HGB) and international accounting standards 
(IFRS/IAS and US-GAAP) do not significantly differ in persistency with 
respect to prior year’s cash flows versus prior year’s accruals. 
Finally, the fourth hypothesis is related to the pricing of earnings components under 
different accounting standards: 
H0(iv):  Accrual anomaly hypothesis under different accounting standards: German-GAAP 
(HGB) and international accounting standards (IFRS/IAS and US-GAAP) do 
not significantly differ with respect to the pricing of earnings components, 
i.e. accruals and cash flows. 
                                                 
15 As of 1998, §292a of the German commercial code (HGB) allowed firms to report consolidates 
balance sheet data under accepted international accounting standards. Since 2005, this act has been 
replaced by §315a HGB following the guidelines of the European Union that all listed companies have 
to comply with IFRS/IAS.   13 
3.3  Sample Selection and Measurement of Variables 
Accounting data used in this study is from Worldscope database, whereas security 
returns and control variables are from Thomson Financial Datastream database. The 
sample consists of firms included in the Datastream Global Market Index for 
Germany and covers the years from 1995 to 2002. Financial years ending before 1995 
could not be used as cash flow data is not available in the Worldscope database. 
Moreover, the sample excludes banks, insurance companies and other financial 
services providers because of the peculiarities in the accrual process. Taking missing 
values into account the final total sample consists of 826 firm-year observations. 
Following prior empirical studies, we define earnings  t EAR  as the year-end’s income 
before extraordinary items deflated by the average of total assets, whereby the 
average is measured from total assets at the beginning and the end of the fiscal year.16 
Moreover, we define the cash flow  t CFO  as the year-end’s net cash flow from 
operating acitivities deflated by averaged total assets.17 
Hence, the following definitions are used: 
ets  total ass average of
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It is commonly accepted to express earnings as the sum of its cash flow and its 
accrual component. Since we have already defined earnings and cash flows, accruals 
t ACC  are equal to the difference between these two variables: 
t t t CFO EAR ACC - =  
                                                 
16 See e.g. Pincus et al. (2003), p. 11. 
17 Referring to the work of Hribar and Collins (2002), we suppose that the cash flow measure provided 
by the cash flow statement via the Worldscope database is more accurate than a measure that is 
derived from balance sheet data, like it is reported in Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001).   14 
Although there may be more accurate measures for the discretionary components of 
earnings,18 we rely on this relatively rough definition. It rules out the possibility to 
exactly identify the eventually mispriced components, but extremely simplifies our 
empirical analysis. Nevertheless, we should be able to detect any kind of mispricing 
on the whole. 
Abnormal security return  t ARE  is calculated as the security’s buy-and-hold return 
beginning on May 1st of the year t and ending on April 30th of the year t+1 less the 
corresponding total return on the Datastream Global Market Index of Germany. The 
return measurement period deviates from the fiscal year because we assume that the 
accounting data is not fully disclosed until May 1st of the following year. 
Furthermore, we define three additional variables that are useful as control variables 
in our abnormal return regression tests. These are the logarithm of the market value 
t MV , the book-to-market ratio  t BTMV  and the earnings-to-price ratio  t ETP , each of 
them measured four months after the fiscal year-end. We include these three 
variables in most of our abnormal return regression tests in order to control for the 
well documented size-, book-to-market- and earnings-to-price effects.19 
4  Empirical Tests and Results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
We begin our empirical analysis by providing descriptive statistics for the variables 
employed in our tests. Table 1 reports the mean, the median and the standard 
deviation of the seven variables for the total sample of 826 observations and four 
sub-samples. As expected, accruals are on average negative which is also a common 
result in other related empirical studies.20 Moreover, the sample is split into two sub-
periods of almost equal size, lasting from 1995 to 1999 and from 2000 to 2002. The 
                                                 
18 E.g. consider the model for discretionary accruals created by Jones (1991). 
19 E.g. Fama and French (1996) show that capital market anomalies largely disappear in a three-factor 
model. 
20 E.g. Xie (2001), p. 361, reports that accruals are on average negative due to the large impact of 
depreciation costs.   15 
comparison of the first and the second sub-period shows that while profitability of 
firms is lower in the second period, abnormal returns are by far higher. This is 
interesting, as we have chosen the two sub-periods in a way that both of them 
include a part of the stock market hype experienced during the years 1999 and 2000. 
Another way to split the sample is to put those firms that comply with German 
GAAP into one sub-sample and those that comply with IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP in 
another. It can be seen from Table 1 that variable medians of these two sub-samples 
are - with one exception - rather close to each other. Only the abnormal returns seem 
to be substantially higher for those firms that are complying with international 
standards. However, in a statistical sense even this difference is not significant. 
Nevertheless, in order to deal with a potential self selection bias arising from this, an 
additional sub-sample will be introduced later on. It consists of those firms that 
switched from national to international accounting standards during the period 1995 
to 2002. Hence, every firm in this sub-sample disclosed at least one financial 
statement under German GAAP and another one under IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP. 
Without presenting the descriptive statistics it should be mentioned that the picture 
is quite similar to that given in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Table 2A reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for the total 
sample and the first two sub-samples, showing that multicollinearity should not be a 
problem in our analysis. In accordance with the results found in earlier studies on the 
US-Amercian stock market, accruals and cash flows are significantly negatively 
correlated with a Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.546 for the whole sample 
period.21 To some extent this result may be due to the fact that we normalize all 
financial statement figures by total assets. In order to see this, assume that return on 
assets, i.e. earnings divided by total assets, are the same for all the companies. Then 
the negative correlation between accruals and cash flow arises by definition, because 
                                                 
21 For a similar result cf. e.g. Sloan (1996), p. 295.   16 
firms with larger operating assets tend to have higher depreciations, and, hence, 
highly negative accruals. In order to reach the same return on assets, those firms 
must have higher operating cash flows. Evidently, in practice we do not have 
industry independent return on assets. Nevertheless, to the extent that there is not a 
perfect correlation between deflated accruals and return on assets, a negative 
correlation between deflated accruals and deflated cash flows arises. 22 Hence, it 
might be safe to argue that this negative correlation is, at least partly, an indication 
that firms use accruals to make earnings smoother than cash flows. 
[Insert Table 2A] 
In the second and third panel of Table 2A the correlation coefficients for the tow 
different time periods are shown. The picture is basically the same, although there is 
one striking difference: the correlation coefficient between accruals and cash flows 
becomes substantially smaller in absolute terms in the second sub-period, indicating 
that the degree of earnings smoothing may have decreased with respect to the first 
sub-period.  
In order to see whether this changed behaviour is related to the adoption of local or 
international accounting standards, we first provide the correlation coefficients for 
the national resp. international accounting standards sub-sample in panel one and 
two of Table 2B. Again it can be seen that there is a significant negative correlation 
between accruals and cash flows, although the degree of correlation – in absolute 
terms - is substantially higher for firms using German GAAP rather than 
international standards.  It is very interesting to see that this difference in the degree 
of correlation disappears, if only those firms are considered that switched form 
national to international standards during the research period. This is what can be 
seen from the third and fourth panel of Table 2B. To some extent this supports the 
assertion that by looking at the sub-sample of switching firms results might be 
                                                 
22 Note that according to Table 2A the correlation between deflated earnings and deflated accruals is 
0.5, and therefore clearly below 1.   17 
corrected for a potential self selection bias. As a conclusion one can say that at this 
point we don’t have any clear evidence whether accounting standards are 
influencing the degree of earnings management. 
[Insert Table 2 B] 
4.2   Test of the persistence hypothesis 
In order to test the first hypothesis, i.e. the earnings persistency of prior year’s 
accruals and cash flows, we follow the approach proposed by Sloan (1996). Hence, 
the following linear forecasting model is estimated: 
1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 ) ( ) ( + + + ￿ + + ￿ + + + = t t t t CFO d ACC d d EAR e b a b a b a   (1) 
The dummy variable d is used in order to test whether persistency may be different 
depending on the time period under scrutiny or on the accounting standard that 
firms are using. H0(i) will be rejected, if the same can be done for the null hypothesis 
2 1 a a = . Table 3 reports the estimates for the persistency parameters of both earnings 
components. For the whole sample one year ahead earnings are significantly less 
persistent with respect to current accruals ( 506 . 0 1 = a ) than with respect to current 
cash flows ( 688 . 0 2 = a ) according to regression results in column (1). This is in 
accordance with international evidence and reflects what would be expected, if 
accruals are considered to be the primary earnings management instrument. 
[Insert Table 3] 
However, by isolating the time as well as the accounting standards effect results 
become quite interesting. According to results in column (2) it turns out that 
differences in persistency are mainly due to financial statements published over the 
period 2000 to 2002. This effect is most probably due to the shift in the accounting 
frameworks used by the companies, as is suggested by columns (3) and (4). 
According to these results there is no significant difference in persistency, if 
companies are using German GAAP, while this difference becomes significant ones   18 
companies switch to international accounting standards. 23 It should be emphasized 
that this effect is unlikely to be driven by a self selection effect, as results in column 
(4) indicate that the effect also exists, even if only those companies are considered 
that switched from national to international standards at one point in time during the 
research period. Hence, our evidence is in accordance with the view that the 
information content of accruals with respect do future earnings decreases, if firms are 
using a true and fair view accounting framework, while the information content of 
cash flows is basically unaffected by the accounting framework choice. As a 
consequence, H0(iii) can be rejected. 
4.3  A first test of the accrual anomaly hypothesis 
After having shown that there is, in fact, a difference in the persistency of the 
accruals and cash flow component with respect to future earnings, at least for those 
firms that comply with international accounting standards, in a second step the 
interesting question must be addressed, whether this difference is efficiently reflected 
in securities prices. Following former studies on the accrual anomaly we use the 
efficient market model as a starting point. In such a market abnormal security returns 
should depend positively on unexpected earnings changes: 
( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + - ￿ = t t t t EAR E EAR ARE n b   (2) 
Now, putting together the earnings forecasting model in equation (1), where we 
eliminate the dummy variable, with the rational pricing equation (2) we get the 
following regression equation system.  






0 1 1 1
1 2 1 0 1
+ + +
+ +
+ ￿ + ￿ + - ￿ =
+ ￿ + ￿ + =
t t t t t
t t t t
CFL ACC EAR ARE
CFL ACC EAR
n a a a b
e a a a
 (3) 
                                                 
23 However, it cannot be ruled out that specific capital market conditions governing during the stock 
market hype may have put additional pressure on firms to manage earnings upward. It may well be 
that these pressures have been a reason why firms switched to international standards, at least in 
some cases.   19 
Following Sloan (1996), we employ the Mishkin-test24 that consists of an iterative 
weighted non-linear least squares regression estimation of this system of equations. 
The null-hypothesis of capital market efficiency with respect to the information 
contained in accruals and cash flows is tested by the non-linear conditions 
*
j j a a =  
2 , 1 , 0 = "j . Moreover, a Wald coefficient test 25 is used in order to additionally test 
these parameter restrictions. 
Results with respect do the whole sample are reported in Table 4. For the 826 firm-
year observations between 1995 and 2002, we reject the null-hypothesis 
*
j j a a =  
2 , 1 , 0 = "j  at a marginal significance level of 0.001. Investors’ subjective earnings 
persistency with respect to accruals ( 819 . 0
*
1 = a ) is very likely to exceed the objective 
persistency parameter ( 507 . 0 1 = a ). Also, the investors seem to overestimate earnings 
persistency attributable to cash flows ( 688 . 0 2 = a and  896 . 0
*
2 = a ). 
[Insert Table 4A] 
Interestingly, if financial statements published over the period 1995 to 1999 are 
considered, it seems that investors underreact to the information contained in both 
earnings components ( 646 . 0 1 = a  and  214 . 0
*
1 = a ;  721 . 0 2 = a  and  420 . 0
*
2 = a ). 
However, the difference in the objective and subjective persistence parameter is not 
so pronounced that a rejection of the null-hypothesis is possible. 26 In contrast, 
investors seem to overvalue the persistency of earnings with respect to both 
components for the following years between 2000 and 2002 ( 477 . 0 1 = a and 
188 . 1
*
1 = a ;  709 . 0 2 = a and  894 . 0
*
2 = a ). In this case a rejection of the null-hypothesis 
is possible. Hence, at this point we can conclude that there is clear evidence in favour 
                                                 
24 See Mishkin (1983) for a description of the conducted test. 
25 Cf. Greene (2000), p. 153 n. 
26 It should be noted that the Mishkin-test is highly sensitive with respect to small sample size due to 
the asymptotic nature of this test. As opposed to that the Wald-test generates a significance level of 
about 6%.   20 
of the accrual anomaly also in Germany, although the phenomenon seems mainly 
driven by the period 2000-2002. Hypothesis H0(iia) can be rejected. 
It is interesting, therefore, to look whether this result may be due to a more general 
change in the capital market’s valuation pattern or to a more widespread adoption of 
international accounting rules. For that purpose it may be purposeful to repeat the 
above presented efficiency test for those firms only that switched from national to 
international standards. Results are presented in Table 4B. Most strikingly, it turns 
out that no significant under- or overreaction to both earnings components can be 
detected as long as firms comply with national accounting standards. As a 
consequence, the market seems to react efficiently to the information contained in 
financial statements prepared under German GAAP. However, if the same firms 
publish their financial statements according to international accounting standards 
things look quite different. In fact, in that case the market significantly overestimates 
the persistency of both earnings components. As a consequence, the price reaction to 
accounting news is not efficient in a statistical significant sense. 
[Insert Table 4B] 
As more firms switched from national to international accounting standards during 
the second half of the research period, it cannot be ruled out that stock price 
overreaction is, after all, caused by specific circumstances governing market 
valuation during that time and, hence, not related to a firm’s decision whether to set 
up financial statements according to national or international standards. Therefore, a 
separate analysis is done for the 2000-2002 period. Results are presented in Table 4C. 
As can be seen, the null hypothesis of rational pricing has to be rejected once again 
for the sub-sample of firms following international standards, while for those firms 
that follow national rules the hypothesis cannot be rejected. This evidence is in 
accordance with the view that market overreaction to accounting news, especially as 
far as accrual information is concerned, is related to the presence of a true and fair 
view accounting system. Hence, we can reject hypothesis H0(iv) by concluding that   21 
accrual information is not efficiently processed by the market, if a company is using  
international standards.  
[Insert Table 4C] 
4.4  A second test of the accrual anomaly hypothesis 
As a robustness check we use an alternative approach proposed in the literature for 
testing the accrual anomaly. If investors have rational expectations, i.e. they do not 
make any systematic errors in forecasting returns, future abnormal returns should 
not depend on past accounting figures. However, if investors overestimate 
(underestimate) the persistency of accruals (cash flows), we expect that this 
mispricing will be resolved over time, and, hence, future abnormal returns will be 
negatively (positively) associated with past accruals (cash flows). This hypothesis can 
be directly tested by the following regression model: 
1 5 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 ) ( ) ( + + + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + + ￿ + + + = t t t t t t t ETP BTMV MV CFL d ACC d d ARE d q q q b q b q b q
                        (4) 
The dummy variable d is used in order to test whether market over- or underreaction 
may be different depending on the time period under scrutiny or on the accounting 
standard that firms are using.  Estimating (4) yields a direct test of hypothesis H0(iib) 
and, by including dummy variables for different time periods or different accounting 
standards, it will give additional insights with respect to hypothesis H0(iv). Equation 
(4) explains future abnormal returns by using past accruals and cash flows as well as 
aditional variables in order to control for the well documented size-, book-to-market- 
and earnings-to-price effects.27 Capital market efficiency with respect to the 
information contained in accruals and cash flows requires the conditions  0 = j q  
2 , 1 = "j . 
The results of the ordinary least squares regression of model (4) are shown in Table 5. 
For the total sample of 826 firm-years results in column (1) are in accordance with the 
                                                 
27 Cf. e.g. Fama and French (1996) who show that future abnormal returns are influenced by variables 
as firm size, book-to-market ratio or earnings-to-price ratio.   22 
rational pricing assumption, as neither current accruals nor current cash flows have a 
significant impact on future abnormal returns. However, if the regression is run in 
order to isolate the time effect, i.e. the influence coming from firm-years belonging to 
the period 2000-2002 is isolated by a dummy variable as is done in column (2), results 
are quite different. It turns out that there is a significant underreaction with respect to 
both current accruals and cash flows for the firm-years 1995 and 1999, while for the 
firm-years 2000-2002 there is a significant overreaction with respect to accruals. By 
isolating the effect coming from different accounting standards by a dummy variable 
approach as is done in column (3) and (4), it turns out that this effect is, at least 
partially, due to the more widespread use of international accounting standards 
during the second half of our research period. In fact, according to the results 
presented in column (3) and (4) there is, if at all, an underreaction to earnings 
presented under German GAAP, while accruals presented under IFRS or US-GAAP 
are significantly overvalued by the market. Interestingly, even the perception of cash 
flow information seems to be different under both accounting frameworks. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Overall, the results in Table 5 corroborate the findings of the preceding section. 
Evidently, the accrual anomaly is present also in Germany. However, we find strong 
evidence that this phenomenon is driven by the widespread switch to international 
accounting standards that occurred in Germany since the year 1998. Our results are 
in accordance with the view that investors do not correctly detect the different 
earnings persistency with respect to accruals and cash flows for firms presenting 
their financial statements under an international framework. 
5  Summary and Conclusions 
We provide evidence that, in accordance with the results reported for the US, 
earnings are less persistent with respect to prior year’s accruals than with respect to 
prior year’s cash flows for German firms as of the year 2000, where the adoption of 
international accounting standards has become a widespread phenomena. Especially   23 
those firms that provide financial data using international accounting standards, like 
IFRS/IAS and US-GAAP, exhibit a lower earnings persistency with respect to 
accruals than with respect to cash flows. For firms following German-GAAP (HGB), 
there is no difference between the earnings persistency of accruals and cash flows. 
For the years prior to 2000, before the adoption of International Accounting 
Standards has widely taken place in Germany, we do not find evidence in favour of 
the accrual anomaly in Germany. However, with respect to financial information 
published during the years 2000-2002 we find a significant overreaction of the capital 
market to accrual information. We present additional evidence that this result is most 
likely driven by the fact that true and fair view accounting became more widespread 
in Germany during this area. In fact, by comparing financial information presented 
under German GAAP as well as under IFRS/IAS resp. US-GAAP we find strong 
evidence that market overreaction to accrual information, and to some extent also to 
cash flow information, is a phenomenon only related to accounting information 
prepared under international accounting standards. Therefore, we conclude that the 
change from national to international accounting standards has not increased the 
reliability of financial accounting data nor improved the financial information 
processing on the German capital market. 
These findings are in accordance with our presumption that conservative accounting 
systems might be more appropriate in weak corporate governance systems. As true 
and fair view accounting necessarily relies on information that is difficult to verify, 
the quality of this information depends on the management incentives to disclose 
reliable information. If such incentives are weak, e.g. because corporate control is lax, 
a true and fair view accounting system might be abused and, hence, produce less 
reliable information. The evidence presented in this paper supports this view. 
However, it should be emphasized that this may not be the only interpretation of our 
results. Most importantly, it could be argued that the different perception of local 
and international standards relates to the fact that German investors and analysts   24 
have not yet become totally familiar with international accounting principles. But 
even these would be bad news with respect to the informational efficiency of capital 
markets and, hence, the efficiency of financial accounting regulation. 
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N  (firm-years) 826 414 412 521 305
EAR 0.040 0.048 0.032 0.047 0.028
0.038 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.038
(0.082) (0.054) (0.103) (0.059) (0.111)
ACC -0.053 -0.057 -0.049 -0.058 -0.045
-0.053 -0.061 -0.047 -0.059 -0.047
(0.090) (0.075) (0.102) (0.083) (0.100)
CFL 0.093 0.104 0.082 0.105 0.072
0.091 0.102 0.083 0.096 0.084
(0.086) (0.076) (0.094) (0.082) (0.089)
ARE 0.127 0.003 0.250 0.090 0.189
0.069 -0.066 0.156 0.038 0.098
(0.505) (0.452) (0.525) (0.454) (0.576)
MV 2.933 2.952 2.914 2.865 3.050
2.805 2.819 2.769 2,738 2.993
(0.692) (0.691) (0.693) (0.801) (0.708)
BTMV 0.568 0.483 0.654 0.526 0.641
0.464 0.435 0.518 0.452 0.493
(0.457) (0.318) (0.550) (0.402) (0.530)
ETP 0.061 0.076 0.046 0.076 0.036
0.051 0.057 0.048 0.057 0.048
(0.127) (0.122) (0.130) (0.115) (0.141)
IFRS/IAS, US GAAP, US GAAP reclassified from local standards
HGB, HGB with EEC and IASC guidelines, HGB with some EEC guidelines
Table 1
c
 Firm-years with the following accounting standards:
Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Selected Variables
a
MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end
BTMV=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end
ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end
b
 Firm-years with the following accounting standards:
EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the Datastream Global Market Index 
for Germany starting four months after the fiscal year end
a
 The variables are computed as follows:
   28 
EAR ACC CFL ARE MV BTMV ETP
EAR 1 0.502** 0.431** -0.087* 0.135** -0.220** 0.089*
ACC 0.277** 1 -0.546** -0.072* 0.003* -0.037 -0.038
CFL 0.447** -0.615** 1 -0.008 0.126** -0.171** 0.124**
ARE -0.013 -0.009 -0.015 1 -0.188** 0.256** 0.127**
MV 0.118** -0.010 0.149** -0.189** 1 -0.209** -0.146**
BTMV -0.359** -0.040 -0.230** 0.240** -0.313** 1 0.049
ETP 0.008 -0.036 0.067 0.212** -0.228** 0.225** 1
EAR ACC CFL ARE MV BTMV ETP
EAR 1 0.343** 0.368** 0.134** 0.072 -0.258** -0.042
ACC 0.193** 1 -0.747** 0.106* -0.103* -0.063 -0.079
CFL 0.409** -0.722** 1 -0.010 0.153** -0.120* 0.048
ARE 0.083 0.010 0.045 1 -0.028 0.092 0.057
MV 0.092 -0.122* 0.200** -0.034 1 -0.306** -0.263**
BTMV -0.288** -0.029 -0.175** 0.116* -0.382** 1 0.160**
ETP -0.066 -0.077 0.024 0.117* -0.289** 0.227** 1
EAR ACC CFL ARE MV BTMV ETP
EAR 1 0.581** 0.460** -0.159** 0.175** -0.191** 0.142**
ACC 0.354** 1 -0.455** -0.206** 0.083 -0.039 -0.003
CFL 0.486** -0.507** 1 0.050 0.101* -0.167** 0.159**
ARE -0.099* -0.109* 0.028 1 -0.325** 0.291** 0.247**
MV 0.142** 0.099* 0.091 -0.368** 1 -0.161** -0.044
BTMV -0.417** -0.081 -0.240** 0.304** -0.241** 1 0.028
ETP 0.067 0.019 0.093 0.391** -0.175** 0.268** 1
BTMV=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end
Table 2 A
N (firm-years): 826
ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the Datastream Global 
Market Index for Germany starting four months after the fiscal year end
a 





ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end
** Significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
* Significance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables
a, b
MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end
b
 The variables are computed as follows:
EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
Sample: 1995-2002
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EAR ACC CFL ARE
EAR 1 0.370** 0.341** 0.081
ACC 0.227** 1 -0.747** -0.059
CFL 0.393** -0.624** 1 0.118**
ARE 0.069 -0.017 0.049* 1
EAR ACC CFL ARE
EAR 1 0.645** 0.514** -0.192**
ACC 0.355** 1 -0.323** -0.102
CFL 0.538** -0.447** 1 -0.124*
ARE -0.143* -0.008 -0.090 1
EAR ACC CFL ARE
EAR 1 0.462** 0.409** 0.071
ACC 0.319** 1 -0.621** 0,014
CFL 0.365** -0.636** 1 0.049
ARE -0.014 -0.013 0.016 1
EAR ACC CFL ARE
EAR 1 0.410** 0.458** -0.282**
ACC 0.217** 1 -0.623** -0.105**
CFL 0.531** -0.608** 1 -0.140
ARE -0.112* 0.039 -0.142 1
* Significance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
National Standards, Switching Firms
e N (firm-years): 253
International Standards, Switching Firms
e N (firm-years): 173
e
 Firms that switched from national to international standards over the research period
HGB, HGB with EEC and IASC guidelines, HGB with some EEC guidelines
d
 Firm-years with the following accounting standards:
IFRS/IAS, US GAAP, US GAAP reclassified from local standards
** Significance at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end
BTMV=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end
ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end
c
 Firm-years with the following accounting standards:
EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the Datastream Global 
Market Index for Germany starting four months after the fiscal year end
International Standards d N (firm-years): 305
a 
Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation coefficients
b
 The variables are computed as follows:
Table 2 B
Correlation Coefficients for Selected Variables
a, b
National Standards c N (firm-years): 521
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Sample                     
Base Case
(1)          
All firms  
1995-2002
(2)                 
All firms     
1995-1999
(3)                             
All firms         
National Standards
(4)                          
Switching Firms 
National Standards
N (firm-years) 826 826 826 426
a 0 0.004 0.009 0.011* 0.003
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
ß0 -0.011 -0.017** -0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
a 1 0.506** 0.682** 0.540** 0.634**
(0.029) (0.060) (0.048) (0.049)
ß1 -0.242** -0.086 -0.229**
(0.068) (0.061) (0.083)
a 2 0.688** 0.746** 0.647** 0.754**
(0.030) (0.059) (0.049) (0.051)
ß2 -0.046 0.107 -0.085
(0.069) (0.064) (0.082)
R² 0.404 0.418 0.413 0.456
adj. R² 0.403 0.414 0.410 0.449
a 1=a 2
b rejection** no rejection no rejection no rejection
a 1+ß1=a 2+ß2
c rejection** rejection** rejection**
Note that regression results seem not to be affected by multicollinearity, as the highest VIF is equal to 1.67. 
d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario and otherwise equal 1 (in eq. (2) if firm-year belongs to 2000-2002, in eq. (3) and (4) if 
firm is using international standards
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
c
 Hypothesis test by a Wald test statistic (cf. Greene (2000), p. 153 n.)
** Significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test
* Significance at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed t-test
b
 Hypothesis test by comparing the confidence intervals of the coefficients
EAR=Earnings before extraordinary items deflated by total average assets
a
 The variables are computed as follows:
Table 3
OLS Regression of One-year Ahead Earnings on Current Accruals and Cash Flows
a
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
1 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 ) ( ) ( + + + ￿ + + ￿ + + + = t t t t CFO d ACC d d EAR e b a b a b a
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Sample 1995-2002 1995-1999 2000-2002
N (firm-years) 826 414 412
a 1 0.507 0.646 0.439
(0.028) (0.041) (0.040)
a 2 0.688 0.721 0.700
(0.030) (0.041) (0.044)
a*1 0.819 0.214 1.188
(0.122) (0.169) (0.234)
a*2 0.896 0.420 0.894
(0.122) (0.157) (0.192)
L
a : a* 0 =a 0 ; a* 1 =a 1 ; a* 2 =a 2 14.658 3.872 8.070
Significance Level (Mishkin Test) <0.001 <0.250 <0.025
Significance Level (Wald Test) <0.001 <0.062 <0.001
a
 The following Likelihood-ratio statistic is distributed asymptotically ?²(q):
Table 4A
Iterative Weighted Non-linear Least Squares for the System of Forecasting Equation 
and Rational Pricing Equation














N L log 2
whereby q=number of constraints, N=number of firm-years, SSR
c=sum of squared residuals of the constrained 
system, SSR
u=sum of squared residuals of the unconstrained system 
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Subsample of Switching Firms All National Standards Int'l. Standards
N (firm-years) 426 253 173
a 1 0.555 0.634 0.404
(0.040) (0.043) (0.079)
a 2 0.723 0.754 0.668
(0.040) (0.044) (0.076)
a* 1 0.731 0.483 1.356
(0.141) (0.167) (0.340)
a* 2 0.924 0.553 1.606
(0.141) (0.174) (0.330)
L
a: a*0 =a 0; a* 1=a 1; a*2 =a 2 19.462 2.446 49.088
Significance Level (Mishkin Test) <0.001 <0.550 <0.001
Significance Level (Wald Test) <0.007 <0.430 <0.007
Table 4B
Iterative Weighted Non-linear Least Squares for the System of Forecasting Equation and Rational 
Pricing Equation
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a














N L log 2
whereby q=number of constraints, N=number of firm-years, SSR
c=sum of squared residuals of the constrained 
system, SSR
u=sum of squared residuals of the unconstrained system 
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Subsample 2000-2002 National Standards Int'l. Standards
N (firm-years) 177 235
a 1 0.444 0.373
(0.062) (0.055)
a 2 0.557 0.801
(0.068) (0.062)
a* 1 0.770 1.152
(0.271) (0.299)
a* 2 0.276 1.288
(0.288) (0.276)
L
a: a* 1=a 1; a* 2=a 2 4.067 6.920
Significance Level (Mishkin Test) <0.145 <0.034
Significance Level (Wald Test) <0.073 <0.031
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses)
a The following Likelihood-ratio statistic is distributed asymptotically ?²(q):
Table 4C
Iterative Weighted Non-linear Least Squares for the System of Forecasting 
Equation and Rational Pricing Equation
whereby q=number of constraints, N=number of firm-years, SSR
c=sum of squared residuals of the constrained 
system, SSR
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Sample             
Base Case
(1)                   
All firms         
1995-2002
(2)                  
All firms        
1995-1999
(3)                           
All firms       
National Standards
(4)                        
Switching firms 
National Standards
N (firm-years) 826 826 826 426
?0 0.218** 0.062 0.101 -0.136
(0.084) (0.086) (0.088) (0.108)
ß0 0.228** 0.234** 0.171*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.072)
?1 -0.331 1.746** 0.635 1.019*
(0.230) (0.456) (0.380) (0.476)
ß1 -2.728** -1.270** -1.887*
(0.519) (0.480) (0.787)
?2 0.007 1.417** 1.305** 1.020*
(0.247) (0.452) (0.385) (0.485)
ß2 -1.468** -2.018** -1.770*
(0.525) (0.506) (0.787)
?3 -0.093** -0.085** -0.094** -0.022
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030)
?4 0.246** 0.213** 0.229** 0.265**
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.043)
?5 0.378** 0.527** 0.502** 0.765**
(0.136) (0.131) (0.136) (0.229)
R² 0.097 0.175 0.126 0.167
adj. R² 0.092 0.167 0.118 0.151
?1+ß1=0 rejection** rejection* rejection*
?2+ß2=0 no rejection rejection* no rejection
Note that regression results seem not to be affected by multicollinearity, as the highest VIF is equal to 1.82. 
a The variables are computed as follows: ARE=Abnormal return measured as the annual buy-and-hold stock return minus the annual return of the 
Datastream Global Market Index for Germany starting four months after the fiscal year end
BTMV=Book-to-market ratio four months after the fiscal year end
ETP=Earnings-to-price ratio four months after the fiscal year end
** Significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test
* Significance at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed t-test
Table 5
OLS Regression of Abnormal Returns on Earnings Components and Control Variables
a
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
d=Dummy variable equal 0 in the base case szenario and otherwise equal 1 (in eq. (2) if firm-year belongs to 2000-2002, in eq. (3) and (4) if firm is 
using international standards
ACC=Earnings before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total 
assets
CFL=Cash flow from operating activities deflated by average total assets
MV=Logarithm of the market value four months after the fiscal year end
5 4 3 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 ) ( ) ( + + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + + ￿ + + + = t t t t t t ETP BTMV MV CFL d ACC d d ARE d q q q b q b q b q
 